Regarding the proposed legislation, he said: ”This is a threat to the Good Friday agreement, as it reopens the agreement with the EU, the Northern Ireland Protocol, which has found a way to balance the problem and keep the border open between Northern Ireland and the Republic. The proposed withdrawal agreement would end the special regime for Northern Ireland if a solution could be found that would provide a border as pictured as the one that became the Good Friday agreement until Brexit. Such a solution has yet to be identified from June 2019. Partial solutions were proposed but were not considered sufficient. 7 Singham, Shanker, How to fix the Irish Border problem, 19 March 2018, available on capx.co/how-to-fix-the-irish-border-problem. See also Hayward, K., How not to fix the Irish Border problem, 7 April 2018, blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2018/04/07/how-not-to-fix-the-irish-border-problem/ . A new analysis that we have just finalised shows that Parliament`s objection to the backstop amounts to an implicit rejection of the Good Friday Agreement, the agreement that ended the armed conflict in Northern Ireland. The reasons why Parliament opposes the ”backstop” are precisely what made the peace agreement work. During the withdrawal negotiations, the Irish border issue was one of three areas that required a specific stream of negotiations to reach the necessary withdrawal agreement before future relations between the UK and the EU could be agreed.    The Irish and British governments as well as EU officials have stated that they do not want a hard border in Ireland, given the historical and social ”sensitivities” that cross the island.  Instead, the agreement found a creative path by allowing a form of co-sovereignty. The Good Friday agreement allowed Northern Irish to identify themselves as Irish, British or both and to have a passport from one or both countries.
In October 2019, the UK and EU negotiators agreed on a revised protocol (see below) that resolved many of these problems by allowing Northern Ireland to leave de jure but effectively the border between the islands (Ireland and Britain). After Brexit, the border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland becomes an external border of the EU.  In theory, a ”hard” border could return, both with fewer and monitored border crossing points, to support the necessary customs infrastructure.  Both the EU and UK negotiating teams have made it clear that this result will not be acceptable in any final withdrawal agreement.   This scenario has been hovering for some time in the fanatical circles of Brexiteer, but it describes a lower level of diplomatic crime than any responsible government would evaporate. Johnson may not be reluctant enough. He does not seem to care about the Good Friday agreement, although he understands that the so-called ”peace process” is a fine rhetorical ornament for speeches that justify the acts that undermine it. He has been as ruthless, unfaithful and selfish in his dealings with Northern Ireland as he has been in all his other relationships.
The author was an economic adviser to French Prime Minister Michel Rocard in 1998, when Rocard negotiated an agreement to restore civil peace in New Caledonia, in the Southwest Pacific.